The biggest channel shift in US life sciences since television advertising is not a new medium. It is a checkout. In under three years Lilly, Pfizer, Novo Nordisk, AstraZeneca and Bristol Myers Squibb have each built a way for a patient with a prescription to buy a branded medicine from them at a published cash price and have it shipped home, and since February the federal government has run a website that sends patients to those prices.
Most of the commentary treats this as a pricing story. I think it is an operating story. When a manufacturer owns the transaction, it inherits the work that payers, pharmacies and physician offices used to do for it without anyone noticing: explaining the price, getting the patient to a prescriber, keeping them on therapy, and answering for every word on the page. Very few brand teams were built for that work, and the ones that treat a checkout as a media buy will learn the difference the expensive way.
These are my views from the commercial side of the industry. They are not legal advice.
Direct-to-patient went from pilot to default in under three years
The timeline is short enough to fit on a napkin. LillyDirect opened in January 2024, connecting patients with independent telehealth providers and home delivery for obesity, diabetes and migraine medicines. PfizerForAll followed that August, with telehealth visits, vaccine booking and delivery for migraine, COVID-19 and flu. In March 2025 Novo Nordisk launched NovoCare Pharmacy, selling every dose of Wegovy to cash-paying patients for $499 a month against a list price of $1,349.
Then policy arrived. The letters the White House sent to 17 manufacturers in July 2025 asked each of them to sell directly to patients at no more than the best price paid in other developed countries. Pfizer's agreement that September included direct-purchase discounts such as 80% off Eucrisa and 40% off Xeljanz. Bristol Myers Squibb and Pfizer started selling Eliquis direct at $346 a month against a $606 list price. AstraZeneca Direct opened at the start of October 2025 with discounts of up to 70% off list on Airsupra and Farxiga. TrumpRx.gov went live on February 5, 2026 with 40 branded medicines from five manufacturers, and added more than 600 generics in May.
The number that matters most is Lilly's. On its second-quarter 2026 call, the company said self-pay made up about 45% of total Zepbound prescriptions and about 55% of new ones. In the drug class the whole industry is watching, the checkout is no longer an alternative channel. It is where most new patients now begin.
Owning the checkout means inheriting four jobs the middle used to do
Here is the frame I find most useful. In the traditional US model, a manufacturer's involvement mostly ended at the wholesaler, and a chain of intermediaries did the rest. Each of them did work the brand rarely saw. When the manufacturer takes the transaction back, it inherits that work whether it budgeted for it or not. I count four inheritances.
Start with the price conversation. A pharmacist used to tell the patient what they owed, and a PBM had decided what that number would be. Now the brand publishes the number and has to explain it. Lilly's self-pay page lists Zepbound from $299 a month for the starting dose to $449 for the higher doses, and ties that top tier to refilling within 45 days. That is a pricing rule, and somebody on the brand team now has to write it in words a patient understands.
Then comes the path to a prescriber. Every manufacturer platform routes patients to a clinician, usually through a telehealth provider the manufacturer describes as independent. That handoff is now part of the brand experience, and it is also where the legal questions concentrate.
Persistence is the third inheritance. Specialty pharmacies and hub services have long made the refill calls, chased the prior authorizations and caught patients drifting off therapy. A cash-pay patient on a manufacturer platform gets none of that unless the manufacturer builds it.
Last is the compliance surface. A pharmacy receipt is not promotional labeling. A manufacturer's pricing page, onboarding email and refill reminder are, and every screen in the flow carries the obligations of promotion, from consistency with the label to a review record.
A published cash price turns revenue management inside out
This is the part I think about most, because pricing is where my time at Model N was spent. The industry has run on a gap between list and net. List was public, net was confidential, and the distance between them was negotiated in contracts with PBMs, health plans and government programs that almost nobody outside the pricing team ever saw.
A cash price published on a manufacturer site, and mirrored on a government site, is a third kind of number. It sits much closer to net, and it is public. Eliquis is the cleanest example. Its list price is $606 a month. The direct-to-patient cash price is $346. The Medicare negotiated price set under the Inflation Reduction Act, in effect since January 2026, is $231 for a 30-day supply. Anyone with a browser can line those up, including the employer paying a PBM to manage the drug.
Once a number is public, it becomes a reference point in every other negotiation. Lilly showed how fast that happens. In March 2026 it launched Lilly Employer Connect, offering employers Zepbound at $449 a month for every dose through more than 15 independent program administrators, outside the PBM. That is the self-pay price for the higher doses, sold to a new kind of customer. The consumer number did not stay a consumer number for long.
For pricing and contracting teams this raises questions I would want answered before any new cash price goes live: how it interacts with government price reporting, what it does to existing commercial contract terms, how a price change reaches every place the price appears, and who signs off. None of those are marketing questions. All of them now show up on a marketing page.
PBMs, field teams and brand teams all lose part of their old job
The obvious loser is the PBM, at least for drugs patients are willing to pay for themselves. A formulary exclusion used to be close to a verdict. CVS Caremark dropped Zepbound from its commercial formularies in July 2025 in favor of Wegovy, then said in May 2026 that it would add Zepbound back as a preferred option from October 1. In the fifteen months between, Lilly's patients had a door the formulary did not control. I would not overstate this. Most US prescriptions are still paid through insurance, and PBMs still decide access for drugs nobody can afford in cash. But the formulary is no longer the only door.
Field forces are the less obvious loser. A rep's call plan is built around the prescribers who write the most. In a cash-pay category, a large share of new prescriptions can come from telehealth clinicians the rep will never meet, and the primary care physician who sees the patient six months later may not have started the therapy. The rep's job shifts from earning the first prescription to supporting the physicians who manage patients after it. Reps also face a question they were rarely asked before, which is what the drug costs a patient paying cash, and their answer has to match the website to the dollar.
Brand teams lose the least and have the most to learn. A checkout is a funnel, and running a funnel is a merchant's skill: conversion, onboarding, refill timing, price communication and churn. Those skills live in retail and subscription businesses. Most life sciences brand teams have built their careers on awareness and physician message pull-through, and the agencies that support them are organized the same way.
The real compliance question is independence, not ad copy
Most compliance attention on consumer promotion has gone to advertising, for good reason. On September 9, 2025, FDA said it was sending thousands of letters to drug companies, including about 100 cease-and-desist letters, and starting rulemaking on the broadcast loophole known as adequate provision. What the end of adequate provision would mean for TV and digital ads is a discussion of its own.
Telehealth was in that crackdown from the first day. FDA's warning letters that day included telehealth companies marketing compounded semaglutide, among them Hims & Hers, and on March 3, 2026 the agency sent 30 more warning letters to telehealth firms over compounded GLP-1 claims. Those letters were about compounders. The question for manufacturers is a different one, and it sits with the HHS Office of Inspector General.
On January 27, 2026, OIG published a Special Advisory Bulletin on manufacturer direct-to-consumer programs under the Anti-Kickback Statute. It listed features that lower the risk when a manufacturer sells to cash-paying patients who are also federal program enrollees: a valid prescription from an independent third-party prescriber, no billing of the drug to Medicare or Medicaid, no marketing of other federally reimbursable products on the platform, pricing not tied to future purchases, availability for at least a full plan year, and no controlled substances. Two days later, Senators Durbin, Warren and Welch wrote to the Inspector General asking whether prescriptions from manufacturer-affiliated telehealth vendors can be called independent at all.
That is the question I would put at the top of any direct-to-patient review. Price pages and ads can be fixed with good review discipline. The structure of the relationship between a manufacturer, a telehealth vendor and the clinician who writes the prescription is much harder to change after launch, and it is the part regulators and Congress have already said they are watching. Every company will reach its own view with counsel. Mine is that the referral path deserves more executive attention than the homepage.
Three questions decide whether a brand needs a checkout at all
The fair objection to everything above is that direct-to-patient is a niche. When Bristol Myers Squibb and Pfizer launched the Eliquis program, they noted that more than 90% of Eliquis prescriptions in the US are covered by insurance. For a drug like that, a cash channel is an access program for a small group of uninsured and underinsured patients. It is worth doing. It is not a new business model, and the same is true for most oncology and rare disease brands, where the patient rarely sees the price.
I think the skeptics are right about most brands and wrong about the ones that matter most for growth. The test I would use has three parts. The first is whether demand starts with the patient, rather than with a diagnosis a specialist makes. The second is whether there is a real coverage gap, so that the cash price is the actual price for a large share of people. The third is whether the drug is a chronic, repeat purchase, so that the relationship is worth owning after the first fill.
Obesity passes all three, which is why it moved first. Migraine, fertility and some respiratory medicines pass two. A brand that passes all three should run its checkout as a business, with a P&L, a pricing plan and someone accountable for persistence. A brand that passes one should run it as an access program and spend its energy elsewhere. The expensive mistake is building the first kind of operation for the second kind of brand.
What commercial leaders should do before the next price change
If your brand passes the three-part test, start by putting pricing, market access, medical, compliance and the brand lead in the same weekly meeting. The checkout is the first place in most companies where all five show up on one screen, and the operating rhythm should reflect that.
Treat every screen of the purchase flow as promotional material, because it is. The pricing page, eligibility questions, onboarding emails, refill reminders and FAQ should go through the same review as a detail aid, with fair balance built into the flow rather than parked in a footer. Build them from approved, modular claims, so that when the price or the dosing changes, the change reaches every asset at once instead of one updated page and a dozen stale ones.
Give persistence an owner. On a cash channel nobody from a specialty pharmacy calls the patient on day 25. The education that keeps someone on therapy through the first difficult weeks used to sit in patient support as a nice extra. On a cash channel it is the revenue line.
Retrain the field for patients who arrive with a price in hand and prescribers the rep has never met, and have counsel review the referral path to every telehealth partner before the site goes live. Then watch three things through 2027: whether OIG turns its bulletin and request for information into a safe harbor, what comes of the senators' questions on telehealth independence, and whether employers follow Lilly's direct model beyond obesity.
Building a checkout takes a quarter. Running what happens after the patient clicks buy is the business we are actually entering.